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Abstract 
Existing studies show that U.S. Treasury bond price changes are mainly driven by public 
information shocks, as manifested in macroeconomic news announcements and events. 
The literature also shows that heterogeneous private information contributes significantly 
to price discovery for U.S. Treasury securities. In this paper, we use high frequency 
transaction data for 2-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury notes and employ a Markov switching 
model to identify intraday private information flow in the U.S. Treasury market. We 
show that the probability of private information flow (PPIF) identified in our model 
effectively captures permanent price effects in U.S. Treasury securities. In addition, our 
results show that public information shocks and heterogeneous private information are 
the main factors of bond price discovery on announcement days, whereas private 
information and liquidity shocks play more important roles in bond price variation on 
non-announcement days. Most interestingly, our results show that the role of 
heterogeneous private information is more prominent when public information shocks are 
either high or low. Furthermore, we show that heterogeneous private information flow is 
followed by low trading volume, low total market depth and hidden depth. The pattern is 
more pronounced on non-announcement days. 
JEL classification: G12, G14  
Bank classification: Financial markets; Market structure and pricing 
Résumé 
Les études réalisées à ce jour montrent que les prix des obligations du Trésor américain 
réagissent surtout aux chocs d’information publique, tels les nouvelles et événements 
macroéconomiques. La littérature indique aussi que les flux d’information privée 
hétérogène jouent un rôle appréciable dans l’établissement des prix de ces titres. À l’aide 
de données de haute fréquence concernant les opérations sur obligations du Trésor à deux 
ans, à cinq ans et à dix ans, les auteurs estiment un modèle markovien à changement de 
régime pour isoler les flux intrajournaliers d’information privée sur le marché de ces 
obligations. Ils démontrent que l’estimation que donne leur modèle de la probabilité de 
tels flux permet de prédire efficacement les variations persistantes des prix. En outre, 
leurs résultats révèlent que les jours où des données macroéconomiques sont publiées, les 
chocs d’information publique et les flux d’information privée hétérogène sont à l’origine 
de l’essentiel des variations des prix des obligations, alors que les autres jours, ce sont les 
chocs d’information privée et de liquidité qui expliquent les variations des prix. Fait 
intéressant, l’information privée hétérogène se répercute davantage sur les prix quand les 
chocs d’information publique sont importants de même que lorsqu’ils sont négligeables. 
En outre, l’arrivée de flux d’information privée hétérogène est suivie d’une baisse de 
l’activité, de la profondeur totale et de la profondeur cachée du marché. Ce phénomène 
est plus marqué les jours où il n’y a aucune nouvelle macroéconomique. 
Classification JEL : G12, G14 
Classification de la Banque : Marchés financiers; Structure de marché et fixation des 
prix I. Introduction
Asset prices are subject to information shocks in ﬁnancial markets and investors constantly update
their valuation of assets as a result of new information arrival. Existing studies on the U.S. Treasury
market show that bond price changes are mainly driven by public information shocks, as manifested
in macroeconomic news announcements and events. Some noticeable studies include Fleming and
Remolona (1999) and Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001), which found that public information shocks
measured by announcement surprise have a signiﬁcant effect on the price of U.S. treasury instruments.
In addition, Fleming and Remolona (1997) ﬁnd that the 25 largest price changes of the on-the-run 5-
year note are all associated with news announcements. Similar ﬁndings are documented in Bollerslev,
Cai, and Song (2000) over a later sample period.
Recent literature further documents that private information ﬂow also contributes signiﬁcantly to
price discovery in the U.S. Treasury market. Green (2004) ﬁnds that post-announcement order ﬂow has
a higher information content in the 5-year Treasury note relative to non-announcement days. Pasquar-
iello and Vega (2007) ﬁnd that private information manifests on days with larger belief dispersion.
Menkveld, Sarkar and van der Wel (2008) provide similar ﬁndings for 30-year Treasury bond futures.
Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) ﬁnd that order ﬂow imbalances account for up to 26% of the day-to-day
variation in yields on days without major macroeconomic announcements. All studies point out that
order ﬂow affects the price discovery process in the Treasury market because order ﬂow aggregates
heterogeneous private information.
The focus of this paper is to extend existing studies and examine intraday private information ﬂow
in the U.S. Treasury market on both announcement and non-announcement days. We argue that analy-
sis of information arrival at a high frequency is important and crucial in the U.S. Treasury market. This
is because information disseminates quickly into bond prices. For instance, Green (2004) points out
that private information dissipates within the ﬁrst ﬁfteen minutes after announcements. In addition, the
Treasury market offers an ideal setting to disentangle public information ﬂow versus private informa-
tion ﬂow. The interpretation of private information in our study is similar to that in Brandt and Kavajecz
(2004). That is, it can take in two different forms. One form of private information stems from hetero-
1geneous interpretation of public information. In particular, some investors may have superior ability in
interpreting public information due to experience or, for example, the use of more sophisticated models
(Brandt and Kajeck (2004)). The other form refers to certain investors’ access to exclusive sources of
information. An example of such private information is that dealers may have private access to client
order ﬂow and thus gain information exclusive to other investors. As shown in Evans (2002) and Evans
and Lyons (2002) using data in foreign exchange markets, such information has predictive power of
short-term price movements. Focusing on announcement days, we examine how heterogeneous private
information among investors interacts with public information ﬂow in driving bond price discovery.
Focusing on non-announcement days, we examine how private information exclusive to certain group
of investors drives the price discovery process of U.S. Treasury securities. In both cases, heterogeneous
private expectations are aggregated through trading into a market price in an imperfect informational
environment. Finally, the Treasury market provides a clean setting to examine heterogenous private in-
formation across market participants. With no cash ﬂow risk, different valuation of Treasury securities
across market participants is primarily due to heterogeneous expectations.
One challenge of our study is that compared to public information ﬂow in the Treasury market,
which generally coincides with news announcements, private information ﬂow is not directly observed.
In this paper, we use the impact of order ﬂow on bond prices to infer private information ﬂow. For
example, Brandt and Kajeck (2004) argue that order ﬂow impact effectively captures heterogeneous
information ﬂow in the U.S. Treasury market. Empirically, Green (2004), Pasquariello and Vega (2007)
use order ﬂow impact to proxy for the level of information asymmetry on announcement versus non-
announcement days in the Treasury market. Loke and Onayev (2007) also ﬁnd state-varying level of
order ﬂow impact in the S&P futures market. Using information from order ﬂow impact, we specify
a Markov switching model to identify private information ﬂow. Using high frequency transaction data
for the 2-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury notes, we obtain 5-minute estimates of the probability of private
information ﬂow (PPIF hereafter). In this aspect, our model can be viewed as an extension of the
existing PIN model by Easley et al. (2002) and Li et al. (2009).
The data used in our study is obtained from the BrokerTec electronic limit order book platform on
2which secondary interdealer trading occurs. It contains not only tick-by-tick information on transaction
and market quotes but also information of the entire limit order book for the on-the-run 2-year, 5-year,
and 10-year notes. This allows us to examine the effect of heterogeneous private information in high
frequency. The detailed information on the limit order book also allows us to examine how liquidity
dynamics interact with private information. A novel aspect of our paper is that we examine how liq-
uidity reacts to information uncertainty. Given that the timing and the context of information arrival is
unknown on non-announcement days, we look at how trading activities and placement of limit orders
differs from that on announcement days. Data on announcements comes from Bloomberg and includes
date, time and values for expected and actual announcements. Since surveys of market participants
provide ex ante expectations of major economic announcements, measures of announcement surprises
or unexpected information shocks can be constructed.
Our results show that PPIF is higher for longer maturity bonds, and higher on announcement days
than on non-announcement days. The ﬁnding is consistent with Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) that price
discovery manifests in less liquid markets. In addition, on announcement days, PPIF coincides with
public information shocks as measured by announcement times.This is consistent with Green(2004)
ﬁnding that the role of private information is hihger at and after announcements.
One of the key questions is whether the PPIF identiﬁed using the Markov switching model indeed
captures information effect on bond prices. To answer this question, we use permanent price impact
as a yardstick to measure the information content of PPIF. The main premise of our analysis is that
if PPIF captures private information ﬂow then we should expect bond price changes associated with
high PPIF to have permanent impact whereas bond price changes associated with low PPIF to have
only transitory effects. We employ both the nonparametric method in Kaniel and Liu (2006) and a
probit model to test the hypothesis. In the probit model, we explicitly control for the effect of public
information shocks as measured by announcement surprises. The results of both the nonparametric test
and the probit model show that bond price changes associated with high PPIF in fact exhibit signiﬁcant
permanent price impact over 30 minutes, 1-hour and 1-day horizons on both announcement and non-
announcement days. Although the impact of PPIF drops overtime, it remains signiﬁcant up to the 1-day
3interval. In particular, the results on non-announcement days provide evidence that the information
content captured by PPIF is largely private in nature.
WethenexaminehowmuchexplanatorypowerPPIFhasforpricebondvariationbyregressingbond
price volatility against PPIF and other control variables. For non-announcement days, the regression
uses 15-minute realized volatility over the entire day, whereas for announcement days the regressions
are performed over the two 15-minute intervals after announcement time. For both announcement
and non-announcement days, we include liquidity shocks in the regression, whereas for announcement
days we also include major announcement surprises to control for the effect of public information
shocks. Consistent with existing studies, our results show that bond price variation is positively related
to public information shocks. Liquidity shocks have a more signiﬁcant effect on price variation on non-
announcement days. Most importantly, for both announcement and non-announcement days, PPIF has
signiﬁcant explanatory power for bond variance, even after controlling for public information shocks
and liquidity shocks. Across maturities, there is a higher sensitivity of bond price variation with respect
to PPIF changes. This is consistent with the notion that heterogeneous private information plays a more
important role in markets with less liquidity. Comparing announcement days with non-announcement
days, PPIF actually plays a more important role on announcement days. This is evidence that investors
hold heterogeneous beliefs of the public information and thus form divergent expectations about future
economic conditions (Green (2004)). As such, the information content of public news announcements
is not impounded into bond prices instantaneously. Instead, it takes trading among investors to discover
new equilibrium prices. The results on announcement days further show that the sensitivity of bond
price variation to PPIF change decreases during the post-announcement period.
To further examine how heterogeneous private information interacts with public information shocks
in driving the price discovery process on announcement days, we sort all announcements into terciles
according to the standardized announcement surprises. In each tercile, we calculate the average PPIF
during the post-announcement period. Interestingly, we observe a rather consistent U pattern in PPIF.
That is, for announcements with large or small information shocks there is a higher level of private
information ﬂow in the market. On the other hand, when announcement surprise is at medium level,
4the level of private information ﬂow is low. Our conjecture is that when announcement surprise is at a
medium level, there is less disagreement or divergent interpretation of the information among investors.
When the information shock is large then there is likely more disagreement and diverse interpretation of
the information among investors. Interestingly, when the information shock is small, the role of public
information in the price discovery is relatively small and heterogeneous private information plays an
important role driving bond prices. To conﬁrm our conjecture, we also compute realized volatility in
the post-announcement period for each of the terciles based on announcement surprises. The return
volatility exhibits a similar U pattern as the PPIF. This is an indication that bond prices converge
relatively slower when public information shocks are either high or low.
Finally, we look at how market liquidity is related to information arrival and how it evolves subse-
quently. We sort the liquidity measures into terciles according to PPIF and look at how they evolve in
the subsequent two hours interval. The results show that a higher level of private information is associ-
ated with lower trading volume, lower depth and lower hidden depth concurrently and in the subsequent
two hour horizon, both at the best quote and on the whole book. The difference is more pronounced on
non-announcement days. It suggests that market participants refrain from trading and posting new limit
orders in the presence of private information. However, information arrival on non-announcement days
affects spread differently. Spread in the highest PPIF group on announcement days reverts subsequently
after information arrival whereas spread on non-announcement days remains at elevated levels for the
next two hours. Our ﬁndings suggests market participants refrain from posting aggressive quotes for
prolonged period when the nature of information arrival is less clear on non-announcement days.
The rest of paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the data used in our study and the
Markov switching model. Section III present main empirical results. Section V concludes.
II. Data and Model
A. Data
The U.S. Treasury securities data are obtained from BrokerTec, an interdealer electronic trading plat-
form in the secondary wholesale U.S. Treasury securities market. Prior to 1999, the majority of in-
5terdealer trading of U.S. Treasuries occurred through interdealer brokers. Since 1999, the majority
of trading of on-the-run Treasuries has migrated to two electronic platforms, the eSpeed and the Bro-
kerTec. Mizrach and Neely (2008) and Fleming and Mizrach (2008) provide detailed descriptions of
the migration to electronic platform and price discovery on the BrokerTec platform. According to Bar-
clay, Hendershott and Kotz (2006), the electronic market shares for the 2-, 5- and 10-year bond are,
respectively, 75.2%, 83.5% and 84.5% during the period of January 2001 to November 2002. By the
end of 2004, the majority of secondary interdealer trading was through electronic platforms with over
95% of the trading of active issues on electronic platforms.1
BrokerTec is more active in the trading of 2-, 5- and 10-year Treasury notes than eSpeed. The
BrokerTec platform functions as a limit order book. Traders can submit limit orders, i.e., orders that
specify both price and quantity posted on the book, or they can submit marketable limit orders, i.e.,
orders with a price better than or equal to the best price on the opposite side of the market, to ensure
immediate execution. Limit order submitters can post “iceburg” orders, where only part of their order
is visible to the market and the remaining part is hidden. All orders on the book except the hidden
part of the orders are observed by market participants. The orders remain in the market until matched,
deleted, inactivated, loss of connectivity, or the market closes. The market operates more than 22 hours
a day from Monday to Friday. After the market closes at 5:30 p.m. eastern time (ET), it opens again at
7:00 p.m. ET.
The sample period is from January 2004 to June 2007. Days with early closing before public hol-
idays are excluded since liquidity is typically low for these days. The dataset consists of over 700.8
million observations and 16.9 million transactions. The dataset contains the tick-by-tick observations
of transactions, order submissions, and order cancelations. It includes the time stamp of transactions,
quotes, the quantity entered and deleted, the side of the market and, in the case of a transaction, an ag-
gressor indicator. Fleming and Mizrach (2008) provide a more detailed description of the microstruc-
ture of BrokerTec platform. We use data from 7:30 a.m. ET to 5:00 p.m. ET since trading is more active
during this time interval. This interval also contains all pre-scheduled U.S. news announcements, and
1See “Speech to the Bond Market Association”, December 8, 2004 by Michael Spencer, founder and chief executive of
ICAP PLC.
6it provides us with 9.5 hours of trading and 114 ﬁve-minute return observations each day.
Table I provides descriptive statistics of the data. Spreads are deﬁned both in relative terms and in
ticks. Relative spread is deﬁned as
relative spread = (best bid price   best ask price)=mid-quote (1)
and measured at the end of each 5-minute interval and averaged over the trading day. Tick spread is
deﬁned similarly. The tick size of the 2-year and 5-year note is 1/128, whereas that of the 10-year note
is 1/64. Daily return volatility is calculated as the square-root of the sum of squared log mid-quote
difference sampled at 5-minute intervals






where the mid-quote is deﬁned as pi = (best bid price+best ask price)=2. The average (hidden) depth
(in millions) at the best bid/ask is the total (hidden) observed depth at the best price on both the bid and
ask side of the market measured at the end of each 5-minute interval and averaged over the trading day.
The average depth and average hidden depth in the entire order book are deﬁned similarly.
BrokerTec is a highly liquid platform over our sample period. As shown in Table I, the relative
spread is smallest for the 2-year note with a sample mean of 0.0109%, followed by the 10-year note
(0.0118%) and 5-year note (0.0126%). Trading volume is highest for the 2-year note ($25.86 billion
per day), followed by the 5-year note ($23.43 billion per day), and 10-year note ($20.70 billion per
day). Intraday return volatility generally increases with maturity, possibly due to higher bid-ask spread
and less market depth at longer maturities. The 2-year note has the deepest book, both at the best quote
($547.09 million) and the entire book ($4,092 million). Hidden depth is low in general, and hidden
orders at the best quote are less than 5% of the observed depth at the best quote for all three maturities.
Figure 1 presents the intra-day activities in the 2-year note. The intraday patterns for other bonds
are similar and thus not reported for brevity. Consistent with the ﬁndings in Fleming (1997), trading
volume peaks ﬁrst in the 8:30 to 10:00 ET interval and goes up again from 13:00 to 14:00 ET. These two
intervals overlap with major macroeconomic announcements. Relative spread is higher at the beginning
(before 8:30 ET)) and the end of the trading day (after 16:00 ET). The depth at the best price is thinner
7before 8:30 ET and after 15:00 ET. For the rest of the day, the book is on average over $600 million.
The level of hidden depth is higher at noon and it goes up again after 15:00 ET. This ﬁnding suggests
that market participants hide more of their orders when there is less total depth in the market.
Data on macroeconomic news announcements and the survey of market participants come from
Bloomberg and Brieﬁng.com’s economic calendar. Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001) show that pro-
fessional forecasts based on surveys are neither biased nor stale. Announcement days are deﬁned as
days in which one or more announcement took place. To ensure the list of announcements is compre-
hensive, we start with the 25 announcements from Pasquariello and Vega (2007). We then include 7
additional economic announcements: FOMC minutes, ISM service, NY Empire State Index, Chicago
PMI, Existing Home Sales, Philadelphia Fed Index, and ADP National Employment Report. In ad-
dition to pre-scheduled news announcements, we collect the auction result release times for 2-year,
5-year and 10-year notes. Lastly, we collect the release of the testimony of Semiannual Monetary Pol-
icy Report and Economic Outlook. The full list of announcements can be found in Table II. Following
Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2007), the standardized





where Ajt is the actual announcement, Ejt is the median forecast for news j on day t, and ˆ j is the
standard deviation of Ajt   Ejt;t = 1;2; ;T.
B. The Markov Switching Model
In this section, we present the Markov switching model used to identify private information ﬂow in
the Treasury market. Information arrival is modeled through state-varying order ﬂow impact. Recent
literature documented that order ﬂow aggregates heterogeneous private information into the price dis-
covery process. Thus the impact of order ﬂow measures the extent of private information incorporated
into price. Furthermore, there is evidence that the impact of order ﬂow is state-varying. Brandt and
Kavajecz (2004) ﬁnd that the impact of order ﬂow on yields is strongest when liquidity is low. Green
(2004) ﬁnds that order ﬂow has a greater impact on bond price when the price change at announcement
8is large. Pasquariello and Vega (2007) ﬁnd that order ﬂow impact is strongest when dispersion of belief
among market participants are high. Loke and Onayev (2007) also ﬁnd a state-varying level of order
ﬂow impact in the S&P futures market.
One common focus of the above studies is the comparison of the impact of order ﬂow in different
market conditions, e.g. liquid versus illiquid market, announcement versus non-announcement days,
etc. As such, the ﬁndings in existing studies are generally aggregated over different market conditions.
This could be the reason that ﬁndings documented in different studies sometimes appear to be con-
ﬂicting with each other. For example, Green (2004) identiﬁes greater informational role of order ﬂow
impact when the market is very liquid, while on the other hand, Brandt and Kavajecz ﬁnd the opposite.
In this paper, we deal with the latent nature of private information ﬂow using a Markov switching
model. The two states of our Markov switching model represent, respectively, a state with low order
ﬂow impact (State 1) and a state with high order ﬂow impact (State 2). The transition probabilities are
deﬁned as
p(pt 2 S1jpt 1 2 S1) = p11 (4)
p(pt 2 S2jpt 1 2 S1) = 1   p11 (5)
p(pt 2 S1jpt 1 2 S2) = 1   p22 (6)
p(pt 2 S2jpt 1 2 S2) = p22 (7)
The higher order ﬂow impact state proxies for the existence of private information. We also incorporate
the standardized surprise of important news announcements to control for the public information shock
on the dynamics of return and volatility. More speciﬁcally,
∆pt = ∆pt 1 +  + PPIF  St + OFOFt + OF;PPIF  OFt  St +
N ∑
j=1
jSURjt + "t (8)
where OFt is order ﬂow measured as the number of bid trades minus the number of ask trades, and
"t  N(0; +
∑N
j=1 jjSurj;tj), i.e., volatility is also affected by public information shocks. In this
model, return is affected by both public information shocks and private information arrival via the
impact of order ﬂow, where OF;PPIF captures the additional effect of private information. If order
ﬂow impact is larger when private information arrives as found in Brandt and Kavajecz (2004), Green
9(2004), Pasquariello and Vega (2007) and and Menkveld et al. (2008), then OF;PPIF should be signif-
icantly positive. Another implication from the model is about how efﬁciently the market incorporates
private information ﬂow. If private information is incorporated quickly into asset prices, then the tran-
sitional probability from information arrival state to information arrival state, p22, should be lower than
the transitional probability from no informed trading to no informed trading p11. This is because infor-
mation dissipates quickly in an efﬁcient market and so informed trading is less likely to continue in the
next period.
To ensure that our result is not driven by the intraday seasonality in volatility as evident in Figure







where ∆ ˜ pt;j is the raw unadjusted log return (times 1,000) within the jth 30-minute interval within the
trading day 2 and 
adj
j is the intraday adjustment factor. We calculate the adjustment for intraday trading
effect using only the data from non-announcement days. That is, 
adj
j is the average realized volatility
within the j interval over all non-announcement days divided by the average realized daily volatility.
Using estimates of the Markov switching model, we calculate the probability of private information
arrival (PPIF) implied by the Markov switching model. The conditional probability of private informa-
tion arrival is given by PPIFt = (Pj 2 S2j∆pj;∆pj 1) and is calculated using the EM algorithm as
described in Hamilton (1990).
III. Empirical Results
A. Estimation Results
We estimate Markov switching models as deﬁned in (??) using data for the 2-, 5- and 10-year treasury
notes. Since we have more than 30 pre-scheduled announcements, it is infeasible to include all of them
in the estimation of the model. Our choice of announcements is based on ﬁndings in previous literature.
More speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst include 7 “inﬂuential announcements” from Pasquariello and Vega (2007):
Change in Nonfarm Payrolls (Nonfarm), Consumer Conﬁdence Index (C.Conﬁ), ISM Index (ISM),
2We divide the trading day into thirteen 30-minute intervals.
10Initial Jobless Claims (Ini.Jobls.), Leasing Indicators (Leading), New Home Sales (NewHome) and
Retail Sales (Retail). Given these announcements, we add announcements to the model one-by-one
sequentially. An announcements is kept in the model if it signiﬁcantly increases model ﬁt, as measured
by the increase in likelihood function. Five additional announcements are included as a result: CPI,
Durable Goods (Dur), GDP advance (GDPadv), PPI and FOMC 3.
Table 3 reports the estimation results. The estimates of OF;PPIF are signiﬁcantly positive for
all maturities. Another interesting observation is that the estimates order ﬂow impact increases with
maturities. This holds for both the states with low and high impact of order ﬂow. Given that the depth
of both the 5-year and the 10-year notes is one-ﬁfth that of the 2-year note, it is therefore easier for
a transaction of a given size to walk up/down the book and create a larger price impact. Thus our
ﬁndings are consistent with Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) ﬁnding that private information manifests in a
less liquid market.
Turning to transitional probability, the results show that the transitional probability of remaining in
State 2 (p22), the high order ﬂow impact state, is lower than the transitional probability of remaining in
State 1 (p11), low order ﬂow impact state for all maturities. The result implies that it is less likely that
private information persists in a market and that it dissipates quickly in an efﬁcient market. Another
ﬁnding is that p22 increases in maturity. This means the private information arrival state is more likely to
persist in longer maturity notes. The ﬁnding is consistent with the fact that price formation or resolution
of information uncertainty is slower in the less liquid 5- and 10-year notes markets.
Table 4 reports the summary statistics of PPIF estimates. We found that the sample mean of PPIF
increases with maturities in all trading days, announcement days and non-announcement days. The
ﬁnding is consistent with Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) that price discovery manifest in less liquid mar-
kets. The sample mean of PPIF is higher on announcement days than on non-announcement days. The
ﬁnding is consistent with existing empirical research on the Treasury market, such as Green (2004),
and Menkveld et al. (2008), in that private information is more prominent during announcement days
than on non-announcement days in the Treasury market. This is because prescheduled announcements
3As there is no announcement surprise in FOMC during the sample period, we set a dummy variable equal to one if
FOMC occurs on a trading day and zero otherwise
11represents the majority of information arrival and traders trade on their heterogeneous interpretation of
public announcements. Nevertheless, the median PPIF of non-announcement days is similar in mag-
nitude to that of announcement days. Thus private information on non-announcement days plays an
important role in the price discovery process as well.
Figure 2 plots the intraday patterns of PPIF based on the Markov switching model for the 2-year
note. The plots are similar for other maturities. PPIF peaks around pre-scheduled macroeconomic
news announcement times, such as 8:30 AM and 10:00 AM. Consistent with the empirical evidence
in Green (2004), Pasquariello and Vega (2007) and Menkveld et al. (2008) that private information is
more evident around announcements, this ﬁnding offers initial evidence that the PPIF estimate captures
the arrival of private information in the Treasury notes market. On days without announcements, the
intraday pattern of information arrival is less distinctive. This is consistent with the intuition that private
information could arrive at any time across the trading day. Nonetheless the PPIF measure is higher
during mid-day and at the end of the trading day. The ﬁnding is not due to intraday seasonality as
it has already been removed from return and volatility dynamics. Our conjecture is that during these
times, particularly at the end of the trading day, it is more difﬁcult to unwind positions. Thus dealers
are more cautious of the possibility of trading against informed traders, resulting in less depth placed in
the market. This in turn leads to a less liquid market and thus private information has a larger impact.
B. Private Information Flow and Price Persistence
In this section, we use price persistence as our main yardstick to examine whether the PPIF measures
from the Markov switching model actually capture private information arrival. If PPIF is truly infor-
mative, then a high PPIF should have long-lasting price persistence because information arrival should
have a permanent effect on price. Otherwise, there should be price reversal.
We ﬁrst use a nonparametric test based on Kaniel and Liu (2006) to examine price persistence. A
5-minute interval is deﬁned as having high (low) probability of private information arrival (hereafter
high (low) PPIF) if the PPIF estimate is above (below) the 20th (80th) percentile of the PPIF estimates
over the previous 5 days. If PPIF contains private information, the future return R[k 1;k+j] = lnPk+j  
12lnPk 1 should remain in the same direction as R[k 1;k] when PPIF is high. The opposite should hold
for the case of low PPIF: price change should reverse if it is not due to information arrival.
More speciﬁcally, let nPPIF be the number of same direction mid-quotes in the 30-minutes, 1-hour
and 1-day following a high PPIF. Further, let PhighPPIF be the fraction of times that PPIF is high and
n be the total number of quotes in the same direction in the 30-minutes, 1-hour and 1-day following
all PPIFt;k. Under the null hypothesis H0 of equal informativeness under high PPIF and other PPIF,
the probability that out of these n quote revisions nPPIF or more are preceded by a signiﬁcant PPIF is
approximated by
1   N[
nPPIF   n  PhighPIA √
n  PhighPIA(1   PhighPIA)
] (10)
where N is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. We conduct the test on the overall
sample, on announcement days and on non-announcement days. The case for low PPIF is deﬁned in a
similar way. Since there may be other announcements in the interim for a 1 day interval, we also control
for the robustness of the test by including only observations without signiﬁcant announcements 4 of
Nonfarm Payroll, Consumer Conﬁdence Index, ISM Index, Initial Jobless Claims, Leading Indicators,
New Home Sales and Retail Sales in the next day interval. The results are qualitatively similar and are
not shown for brevity purpose.
The results of the model are reported in Table 5. The ﬁrst set of columns shows the p-values of
the non-parametric test of price persistence following high PPIF on all trading days, on announcement
days and on non-announcement days, respectively. In all three maturities, the null hypothesis of equal
informativeness is rejected at the 1% level for the 30-minute, 1-hour and 1-day horizon. The results
hold for all trading days, announcement days and non-announcement days. Thus the results indicates
that PPIF is informative – a high PPIF is related to informed trading and leads to permanent price
change. Contrary to the results in the high PPIF group, the null hypothesis of equal informativeness in
the low PPIF group is not rejected in all maturities. The result indicates that a low PPIF is associated
with the absence of private information arrival and thus price change is less likely to persist as a result.
One disadvantage of the nonparametric test is that a cutoff criteria has to be imposed to deﬁne
4We deﬁne signiﬁcant announcements with standardized surprise larger than or equal to 1
13the high and low PPIF group. We next look at whether a larger PPIF measure is more likely to be
related to a same direction future price change via a probit regression. More speciﬁcally, we create a
dummy variable P(statet+h). It is equal to 1 if R[t 1;t+h] is in the same direction as R[t 1;t], where h
is set equal to a 30-minute, 1-hour or 1-day horizon. If PPIF measures are informative for future price
change, the likelihood of observing same direction price change increases with PPIF and PPIF should
be signiﬁcantly positive in the probit regression. We test this prediction by running probit regressions,
where the dependent variable is P(statet+h) and the explanatory variable is PPIF. More speciﬁcally,
the regression on non-announcement days is speciﬁed as
P(statet+hjnon   announcementdays) = f( + PPIFPPIFt) (11)
We also include announcement surprises as control variables on announcement days. The regression
on announcement days is speciﬁed as




In terms of predictive power of the PPIF measures, results in Table 6 are consistent with the ﬁndings
in the nonparametric model. The PPIF measures are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant for 30-
minute, 1-hour and 1-day horizons. This holds for all trading days, announcement days, and non-
announcement days. This implies that a higher PPIF is related to a higher likelihood of a same direction
price change. That is, PPIF captures private information arrival in the Treasury market. We also ﬁnd
evidence that the predictive power of the PPIF measures drops over time. The predictive power of
PPIF is strongest at the 30-minute horizon. But the magnitude of the coefﬁcient capturing the impact
of PPIF drops successively as we move to the 1-hour and 1-day horizons for both announcement and
non-announcement days. Nevertheless the impact of PPIF remains signiﬁcant over the 1-day interval.
C. Private Information Flow and Bond Price Variation
In this section, we examine how much explanatory power PPIF has for bond price variation by regress-
ing bond price volatility against PPIF and other control variables. The idea that volatility is related
to information arrival dates back to Clark (1973). Ross (1989) further shows that price volatility is
14perfectly correlated with information arrival in an arbitrage free economy. Other related work includes
Andersen (1996), Andersen and Bollerslev (1997). In these models, there is no distinction between
public or private information. Changes in volatility could be due to either type of information. Exam-
ining the explanatory power of PPIF allow us to explore whether private information affects volatility.
If volatility only captures public but not private information, then the PPIF measure should not be
signiﬁcant.
On non-announcement days, the regression is performed using 15-minute realized volatility over
the entire day. The explanatory variables include PPIF and liquidity shocks variables
RV =  + PPIFPPIF 
+sprdshksprdshk + trdshktrddshk + depshkdepdshk + " (13)







and PPIF is PPIF averaged over the corresponding 15 minute interval. The standardized shock to








where spread is the average spread during the 15-minute interval and spreadt;j is the spread within
the same 15-minute interval during the past ﬁve most recent non-announcement days. The standardized
shock to overall market depth, depshk, and trading volume, trdshk, are deﬁned similarly.
On announcement days, the regressions are performed over the two 15-minute intervals after the
announcement time. In addition to liquidity shocks, we also include major announcement surprises
to control for the effect of public information shocks. The purpose is to examine what role private
information plays after public information shocks. The regression we estimate is speciﬁed as




+sprdshksprdshk + trdshktrddshk + depshkdepdshk + "t (16)
15The results provide insights into the role played by private information , public information and
liquidity in price variation. Consistent with existing studies, our results (see Table 7) show that volatil-
ity is positively related with public information shocks. For all three maturities we examine, realized
volatility signiﬁcantly increases with respect to announcement surprises in Change in Nonfarm Pay-
roll, CPI and GDP. The effect is signiﬁcant for the two 15-minute intervals after announcement time.
Liquidity shocks, on the other hand, play a marginal role immediately after an announcement. The
three liquidity shock measures contribute to less than 1% of the variation in volatility immediately after
announcements whereas their contribution rises to more than 15% of the variation in volatility in the
second 15-minute interval after announcements.
Most importantly, for both announcement and non-announcement days, PPIF has signiﬁcant ex-
planatory power for bond variance, even after controlling for public information and liquidity shocks.
Moreover, there is a higher sensitivity of bond price variation with respect to PPIF changes in the 5-
and 10-year notes on both announcement days and non-announcement days. This is consistent with the
notion that heterogeneous private information plays a more important role in markets with less liquid-
ity. The results on announcement days further show that the sensitivity of bond price variation to PPIF
change decreases during the post-announcement period. This is consistent with Green (2004) ﬁnding
that the private informational role of trading is highest immediately after an announcement. Compar-
ing announcement days with non-announcement days, PPIF plays a more important role in volatility
immediately after announcement. This is evidence of how important investor interpretation of public
information is to the price discovery process. Nevertheless, PPIF remains signiﬁcantly positive on non-
announcement days and the magnitude of coefﬁcients is similar to the second 15-minute interval after
announcements.
D. Public Information Shocks and Heterogeneous Private Information
In this section, we further examine how heterogeneous private information interacts with public infor-
mation shocks in driving the price discovery process on announcement days. We sort all announce-
ments into terciles according to the standardized announcement surprises. In each tercile, we calculate
16the average PPIF during the post-announcement period.
The second column in Table 8 shows the PPIF sample mean of all news announcements (Panel A)
and a selection of individual news announcements (Panel B to Panel E) over two 15-minute intervals
after announcement time. Interestingly, we observe a rather consistent U pattern in PPIF. That is, for
announcements with large or small information shocks there is a higher level of private information
ﬂow in the market. The U pattern holds for both 15-minute intervals after announcements, though
the level of PPIF in the second 15-minute interval is lower. On the other hand, when announcement
surprise is at a medium level, the level of private information ﬂow is also low. Our conjecture is that
when announcement surprise is at medium level, there is less disagreement or divergent interpretation
of the information among investors. When the information shock is large then there is likely more
disagreement and diverse interpretation of the information among investors. Interestingly, when the
public information shock is small, the role of public information in the price discovery is relatively
small and heterogeneous private information plays an important role driving bond prices. We also ﬁnd
that the level of private information varies among announcements. The PPIF level after the Change
in Nonfarm Payroll remains consistently higher than, say, Consumer Conﬁdence in the subsequent 30
minutes interval, though the absolute surprise level is similar across the two announcements
To conﬁrm our conjecture, we also compute realized volatility and bid-ask spread in the post-
announcement period for each of the terciles based on announcement surprises. The third and the last
column in Table 8 shows the result on post-announcement realized volatility and bid-ask spread. The
return volatility and spread exhibit a similar U pattern as the PPIF. Similar to the patterns of PPIF,
realized volatility (spread) is higher (wider) with large or small information shocks for both 15-minute
intervals after announcements. This is an indication that bond prices converge relatively slower when
public information shocks are either high or low.
E. Private Information Flow and Market Liquidity
We next look at how liquidity is related to private information arrival and how it evolves subsequently.
We offer two novel contributions to the literature. The ﬁrst is that we examine liquidity after private
17information arrival on non-announcement days. The issue is important because the nature of informa-
tion arrival on non-announcement days is different in that both the timing and the context of private
information arrival is more uncertain than on non-announcement days. This uncertainty could potential
impact the liquidity of the market. Our second contribution is that we consider a more complete set
of liquidity measures. In addition to trading volume and bid-ask spread, we examine how the market
depth at the best quotes, overall depth and hidden depth of the limit order book evolves after private in-
formation arrival. This is particularly important given the growing importance of limit order platforms
in equity, foreign exchange and Treasury markets.
We sort liquidity measures – trading volume, depth at the best quotes, overall depth, hidden depth
at the best quote, overall hidden depth and spread– according to their associated PPIF estimates at each
5-minute interval into 3 terciles and examine how liquidity measures are related to private information
concurrently and in the subsequent two hour interval. On announcement days, we sort the PPIF for
at announcements times. On non-announcement days, we sort PPIF from 8:00 ETS to 15:00 ETS
during the trading day. For each group, we report the sample mean depth at the best quotes (DEP0),
overall depth (DEPALL), hidden depth at the best quotes (HID0), overall hidden depth (HIDALL),
trading volume (TRDQN), and relative bid-ask spread (SPREAD) concurrently. We then calculate
the averages of these variables within each group in the next 30-minutes interval, 30- to 60- minutes
interval, 60- to 90- minutes interval , and 90- to 120- minutes interval.
Table 9 reports the sorting results for the 2-, 5- and 10-year notes. Trading volume at announcement
times is higher than that on non-announcement days, which is consistent with existing empirical ﬁnd-
ings. Most interestingly, our ﬁndings for trading volume offer a partial explanation for the contrasting
ﬁnding in Green (2004) and Brandt and Kavajecz (2004): Green (2004) found that information asym-
metry increases during announcements when trading volume is high in the 5-year note while Brandt and
Kavajecz (2004) found that level of information asymmetry increases when market liquidity is low. We
indeed ﬁnd that trading volume is decreasing with PPIF on non-announcement days. At announcement
times, trading volume varies with PPIF in a U-shape pattern in the 5-year and 10-year notes. Trading
volume is high in both the low PPIF group and the high PPIF group. It seems that when information
18asymmetry is high and the context of private information is uncertain on non-announcement days, mar-
ket participants refrain from trading in the market and thus high information asymmetry is associated
with a lower level of trading volume. But when the context of information is known at announcements,
traders who are conﬁdent about their interpretation of information enters the market to trade and thus
high information asymmetry is also associated with a higher level of trading volume.
Next we examine how market depth reacts to private information arrival. This issue has largely
been unexplored in the literature because information on depth was generally not available before the
transition to the electronic limit order book in the Treasury market. Depth on the best quote and overall
depth is decreasing in PPIF concurrently at announcements and on non-announcement days. However,
subsequent depth evolves differently afterwards. Following high PPIF at announcements both measures
of depth increase in the subsequent two hours interval. This suggests that market participants post more
limit orders on the book after resolution of information uncertainty at announcements. Following high
PPIF on non-announcement days, however, both measures of depth either drop (in the case of the 2-year
note) or remains stable (in the case of the 5- and 10-year notes) afterwards. This suggests that market
participants refrain from posting limit orders when the nature of information is relatively uncertain on
non-announcement days.
Hidden depth also reacts differently to private information at announcement times and on non-
announcement days. Similar to market depth, hidden depth at the best quote and overall hidden depth
on non-announcement days is decreasing in the level of private information concurrently and rises
afterwards. However, hidden depth increases with level of private information at announcement times.
The result seems to suggest that market participants place more hidden depth when the nature and
timing of information arrival is known.
The nature of information arrival also plays an important role in spread. Concurrent spread is
negatively related to PPIF in general. It is highest in the highest PPIF group both at announcement
times and on non-announcement days. However, spread in a high PPIF group on announcement days
reverts subsequently . The intuition is that once information unfolds in announcements, uncertainty
quickly resolves in the treasury market. On the other hand, spread in the highest PPIF group on non-
19announcement days remains at around the same level in the subsequent two hours horizon. Thus market
participants refrain from posting aggressive quotes when the nature of private information arrival is
unknown on non-announcement days.
Volatility varies differently at announcement times and on non-announcement days. Volatility in-
creases with private information level at announcement times. It then drops in the subsequent two
hours. This suggests that uncertainty resolves quickly after announcements. However, volatility on
non-announcement days exhibits a U-shaped pattern. It is high with both low and high levels of private
information. Moreover, subsequentvolatilitydropsonlyslightly. Thissuggeststhatvolatilityconverges
slowly after both high and low levels of private information on non-announcement days.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the informativeness of return volatility and order ﬂow impact in the US
treasury market. We use a simple Markov switching model and obtain estimates of the probability of
information arrival(PPIF) over 5-minute intervals to examine private information on both announce-
ment days and non-announcement days. Results of both a nonparametric test and a probit model show
that bond price changes associated with high PPIF exhibit signiﬁcant permanent price impact over 30
minute, 1-hour and 1-day horizons on both announcement and non-announcement days. Although the
impact of PPIF drops overtime, it remains signiﬁcant up to the 1-day interval.
Consistent with existing studies, our results show that bond price variation is positively related to
public information shocks. Liquiidty shocks have a more signiﬁcant effect on price variation on a
non-announcement days. Most importantly, for both announcement and non-announcement days, PPIF
has signiﬁcant explanatory power for bond variance, even after controlling for public information and
liquidity shocks.
We also ﬁnding interesting relationships between informativeness and subsequent liquidity dynam-
ics. A higher level of private information is associated with lower trading volume, lower depth and
lower hidden depth concurrently and at the subsequent two hour horizon, both at the best quote and
on the whole book. The difference is more pronounced on non-announcement days. It suggests that
20market participants refrain from trading and posting new limit orders after information arrival. How-
ever, information arrival on non-announcement days affects spread differently. Spread in the highest
PPIF group on announcement days reverts subsequently after information arrival but spread on non-
announcement days remains at elevated levels. Our ﬁndings suggests market participants refrain from
posting aggressive quotes for a prolonged period when the nature of information arrival is unknown on
non-announcement days.
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23Table 1. Summary Statistics of Market Activities
This table reports the summary statistics of daily trading volume ($ billions), daily return volatility (%) of
5-minute returns based on the mid bid-ask quote from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., relative spread (10;000)
and spread in ticks, average depth at the best bid and ask ($ millions), average depth in the entire order book
($ millions), average hidden depth at the best bid and ask ($ millions), and average hidden depth in the
entire book during the sample period from January 5, 2004 to June 29, 2007. Spread and depth variables
are averaged over 5-minute intervals of the trading day.
Variable Mean Median StDev Max Min Skewness Kurtosis
Panel A: 2-year note
Spread (in ticks) 0.86 0.84 0.07 1.55 0.78 3.80 25.81
Relative spread (  10,000) 1.09 1.06 0.09 1.98 0.99 3.91 27.28
Trading volume ($ billions) 25.86 23.94 12.18 108.83 6.05 1.61 8.07
Return volatility (%) 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.57 0.03 5.04 45.65
Depth at the best bid and ask 547.09 509.98 334.78 1567.41 63.27 0.35 1.98
Hidden Depth at the best bid and ask 28.02 22.37 22.46 285.27 1.82 3.39 28.14
Depth of the entire order book 4092.43 3348.95 3136.67 11980.99 145.32 0.40 1.90
Hidden depth of the entire order book 70.81 54.72 61.36 561.15 3.89 2.72 14.87
Panel C: 5-year note
Spread (in ticks) 0.99 0.94 0.18 2.40 0.81 3.48 20.62
Relative spread (  10,000) 1.26 1.18 0.22 3.02 1.03 3.45 20.20
Trading volume ($ billions) 23.43 22.05 9.50 67.81 5.65 0.99 4.63
Return volatility (%) 0.18 0.16 0.10 1.66 0.06 5.98 67.36
Depth at the best bid and ask 107.13 107.50 51.64 237.99 20.90 0.32 2.09
Hidden Depth at the best bid and ask 6.24 5.09 4.40 39.37 0.14 1.85 9.20
Depth of the entire order book 1142.62 939.02 861.82 3819.46 81.98 0.84 2.91
Hidden depth of the entire order book 33.54 23.35 102.25 2883.53 1.22 26.03 723.85
Panel D: 10-year note
Spread (in ticks) 1.87 1.80 0.24 3.35 1.60 2.69 12.21
Relative spread (  10,000) 1.18 1.13 0.15 2.14 0.99 2.72 12.51
Trading volume ($ billions) 20.70 19.82 8.94 69.64 4.14 0.85 4.67
Return volatility (%) 0.30 0.28 0.15 1.92 0.11 4.48 37.74
Depth at the best bid and ask 108.71 108.39 49.54 243.36 16.46 0.23 2.29
Hidden Depth at the best bid and ask 5.16 4.32 3.75 30.31 0.13 2.24 11.75
Depth of the entire order book 1347.02 1117.87 910.89 3739.46 81.28 0.55 2.18























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Table 3. Estimation Results of the Markov Switching Model
This table reports the estimation results of the Markov switching model with state-varying order ﬂow impact




where "t  N(0; +
∑N
j=1 jjSURj;tj) , St is a latent variable that equals 1 if private information arrives
at the market and 0 otherwise. We include standardized announcement surprises SURjt for the following
12 important news and events (i.e., N = 12): Nonfarm Payroll, Consumer Conﬁdence Index, ISM Index,
Initial Jobless Claims, Leading Indicators, New Home Sales, Retail Sales, CPI, Durable Goods Orders, GDP
Advance, and PPI. In addition, we set a dummy variable for FOMC. Estimates related to news announcements
and events are not reported for brevity.
Parameter 2-year Note 5-year Note 10-year Note
 0.010 0.044 0.058
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPIF 0.052 0.027 -0.060
(0.050) (0.256) (0.779)
 0.570 1.350 2.276
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OF 0.014 0.021 0.038
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OF;PPIF 0.116 0.117 0.186
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
p11 0.989 0.983 0.983
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
p22 0.418 0.704 0.718
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Announcement Surprises   
(Included)
Likelihood Function -75098 -148436 -192485
27Table 4. Summary Statistics of the Probability of Private Information Flow (PPIF)
This table reports the summary statistics of the estimates of the probability of private information
ﬂow (PPIF) based on the Markov switch model as in equation (8). The results are based on 5-minute
data.
Maturity Mean Median StDev. Max. Min. Skew. Kurt. 1 2 3
Panel A: All Days
2-year 0.019 0.009 0.071 0.042 0.000 10.796 132.818 0.396 0.224 0.163
5-year 0.049 0.019 0.121 0.187 0.000 5.385 35.629 0.635 0.480 0.393
10-year 0.051 0.020 0.120 0.200 0.000 5.242 34.352 0.653 0.497 0.411
Panel B: Announcement Days
2-year 0.020 0.009 0.078 0.045 0.000 9.943 111.673 0.395 0.223 0.161
5-year 0.053 0.019 0.131 0.218 0.000 5.045 31.125 0.627 0.475 0.389
10-year 0.055 0.020 0.130 0.235 0.000 4.906 29.949 0.647 0.491 0.407
Panel C: Non-announcement Days
2-year 0.014 0.011 0.039 0.035 0.000 15.550 317.207 0.409 0.231 0.191
5-year 0.037 0.019 0.081 0.112 0.000 6.821 61.666 0.697 0.518 0.422
10-year 0.039 0.021 0.080 0.123 0.000 6.700 60.886 0.702 0.546 0.446
28Table 5. Nonparametric Test of Permanent Price Impact
This table reports the p-values (%) of the nonparametric test of permanent price impact conditional
on high (low) PPIF where high (low) PPIF estimates are deﬁned as above (below) the 33th (66th)
percentile of the PPIF estimates over the past 5 days. Details of the nonparametric test can be found
in Kaniel and Liu (2006).
High PPIF Low PPIF
30-min Ret 1-hour Ret 1-day Ret 30-min Ret 1-hour Ret 1-day Ret
Panel A: All Days
2-year 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 99.94
5-year 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
10-year 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Panel B: Announcement Days
2-year 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 99.99
5-year 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
10-year 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Panel C: Non-announcement Days
2-year 0.00 0.00 0.00 92.17 83.21 69.43
5-year 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 99.92 99.81
10-year 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 99.99 98.35
29Table 6. Estimation Results of the Probit Model for Permanent Price Impact
This table reports the estimation result of the probit model that relate the direction of future price change
to PPIF estimates. The ﬁrst column reports the results for all trading days, the second column reports the
results for announcement days and the last column reports the results for non-announcement days.
All Days Announcement days Non-announcement days
30 min 1 hour 1 day 30 min 1 hour 1 day 30 min 1 hour 1 day
Panel A: 2-year note
 -0.552 -0.587 -0.667 -0.524 -0.558 -0.642 -0.691 -0.746 -0.761
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPIF 2.493 2.190 1.557 2.277 1.994 1.453 6.448 6.895 2.769
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SUR (included)   
Likelihood
Function -38334 -37648 -35970 -29205 -28740 -27473 -9048.0 -8809.6 -8446.7
Panel B: 5-year note
 -0.053 -0.111 -0.230 -0.044 -0.100 -0.219 -0.086 -0.150 -0.266
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPIF 1.238 1.046 0.643 1.190 0.986 0.606 1.549 1.495 0.877
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SUR (included)   
Likelihood
Function -43020 -43022 -42472 -32404 -32441 -32080 -10605 -10566 -10379
Panel C: 10-year note
 -0.115 -0.168 -0.272 -0.101 -0.154 -0.260 -0.170 -0.222 -0.316
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPIF 1.357 1.150 0.748 1.277 1.072 0.693 1.975 1.753 1.149
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SUR (included)   
Likelihood
Function -43006 -42897 -42225 -32633 -32584 -32116 -10352 -10290 -10092
30Table 7. The Effect of Information Shocks, Liquidity Shocks, and PPIF on Bond Price Variations
This table reports the estimation results of the regressions of bond return volatility. The explanatory
variables include PPIF, liquidity shocks and absolute announcement surprise for two post-announcement
period (15-minute horizon, (0,15], and 15- to 30-minute horizon, (15, 30], after announcement ), and
PPIF and liquidity shocks for pre-announcement period and non-announcement days. The announcements
includes Nonfarm Payroll (Nonfarm), Consumer Conﬁdence Index (C.Conﬁ), ISM Index (ISM), Initial
Jobless Claims(Ini.Jobls.), Leading Indicators (Leading), New Home Sales (NewHome), Retail Sales
(Retail), CPI, Durable Goods (Dur), GDP advance (GDPadv) and PPI.
Panel A: 2-year Note
Pre-Ann. Post-Ann . (0,15] Post-Ann . (0,15] Post-Ann . (15,30] Post-Ann . (15,30] Non-Ann.
 0.013 0.018 0.018 0.015 0.014 0.010
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPIF 0.021 0.057 0.056 0.023 0.022 0.030
(0.286) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DEPALLSHK 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.854) (0.094) (0.000) (0.152)
SPRDSHK -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.913) (0.703) (0.091) (0.117)
TRDQNSHK -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.568) (0.537) (0.000) (0.000)
NonFarm 0.083 0.083 0.013 0.010
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
C.Conﬁ 0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.001
(0.336) (0.360) (0.929) (0.361)
CPI 0.011 0.010 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.064)
Dur 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.275) (0.243) (0.302) (0.307)
GDPadv 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.003
(0.011) (0.010) (0.004) (0.008)
ISM 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001
(0.100) (0.101) (0.163) (0.475)
Ini.Jbls 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.118) (0.080) (0.127) (0.083)
Leading -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.558) (0.629) (0.034) (0.069)
NewHome 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.363) (0.345) (0.063) (0.217)
PPI -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.895) (0.908) (0.616) (0.118)
Retail 0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(0.496) (0.506) (0.723) (0.841)
Adj. R2 -0.0063 0.5556 0.5558 0.2578 0.3790 0.2361
31Panel B: 5-year Note
Pre-Ann. Post-Ann . (0,15] Post-Ann . (0,15] Post-Ann . (15,30] Post-Ann . (15,30] Non-Ann.
 0.026 0.039 0.040 0.032 0.030 0.021
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPIF 0.025 0.099 0.101 0.051 0.047 0.047
(0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DEPALLSHK 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.018) (0.489) (0.380) (0.000)
SPRDSHK 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.825) (0.159) (0.552) (0.968)
TRDQNSHK -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.861) (0.241) (0.000) (0.000)
NonFarm 0.228 0.231 0.034 0.027
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
C.Conﬁ 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.000
(0.640) (0.556) (0.739) (0.854)
CPI 0.023 0.024 0.010 0.008
(0.011) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001)
Dur 0.009 0.010 0.001 0.001
(0.253) (0.191) (0.602) (0.794)
GDPadv 0.019 0.020 0.009 0.008
(0.078) (0.059) (0.002) (0.006)
ISM 0.013 0.015 0.004 0.003
(0.123) (0.076) (0.068) (0.194)
Ini.Jbls 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.244) (0.237) (0.071) (0.074)
Leading -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002
(0.385) (0.383) (0.104) (0.223)
NewHome 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004
(0.464) (0.420) (0.109) (0.098)
PPI -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.767) (0.792) (0.756) (0.481)
Retail 0.020 0.019 -0.006 -0.005
(0.081) (0.085) (0.064) (0.074)
Adj. R2 0.0168 0.5492 0.5501 0.3898 0.4383 0.2484
32Panel C: 10-year Note
Pre-Ann. Post-Ann . (0,15] Post-Ann . (0,15] Post-Ann . (15,30] Post-Ann . (15,30] Non-Ann.
 0.045 0.070 0.062 0.057 0.052 0.038
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPIF 0.021 0.100 0.088 0.069 0.065 0.081
(0.178) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DEPALLSHK -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.818) (0.597) (0.000) (0.000)
SPRDSHK 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.953) (0.718) (0.147) (0.059)
TRDQNSHK 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.005
(0.254) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NonFarm 0.294 0.277 0.049 0.036
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
C.Conﬁ 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.002
(0.457) (0.649) (0.400) (0.536)
CPI 0.041 0.030 0.013 0.009
(0.000) (0.011) (0.002) (0.018)
Dur 0.011 0.005 0.001 -0.000
(0.264) (0.628) (0.807) (0.971)
GDPadv 0.041 0.036 0.016 0.014
(0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003)
ISM 0.022 0.013 0.006 0.003
(0.047) (0.251) (0.120) (0.401)
Ini.Jbls 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.004
(0.186) (0.233) (0.039) (0.029)
Leading -0.012 -0.008 -0.005 -0.003
(0.221) (0.390) (0.121) (0.369)
NewHome 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.004
(0.993) (0.944) (0.520) (0.293)
PPI 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.872) (0.902) (0.997) (0.931)
Retail 0.013 0.008 -0.007 -0.006
(0.369) (0.580) (0.196) (0.227)









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Table 9. Relation between PPIF, Volatility and Liquidity Variables
The table reports how liquidity is related to PPIF. On announcement days, we sort PPIF at announcements into
3 equal groups. On non-announcement days, we sort PPIF at each 5-minute interval into 3 equal groups . For
each group, we report the average of depth at the best quotes (DEP0), overall depth (DEPALL), hidden depth
at the best quotes (HID0), overall hidden depth (HIDALL), trading volume (TRDQN), relative bid-ask spread
(SPREAD), and volatility (VOLATILITY) at the same time interval (denoted by ( 5;0]). We then calculate the
averages of these variables within each tercile group in the next 30-minutes interval (0;30], 30- to 60- minutes
interval (30;60], 60- to 90- minutes interval (60;90], and 90- to 120- minutes interval (60;120]. We use 8:30
announcements which are not followed by 10:00 announcements to get cleaner results (i.e. ( 5;0] represents the
5-minute interval before an 8:30 announcement). On non-announcement days, data from 8:00a.m. till 3:00p.m.
are used.
Panel A: 2-year note
Post-Announcement Period Non-announcement Days
PPIF ( 5;0] (0;30] (30;60] (60;90] (90;120] PPIF ( 5;0] (0;30] (30;60] (60;90] (90;120]
A.1. TRDQN
0.0002 1190.8 565.3 363.7 351.7 321.2 0.0003 372.3 243.6 224.2 208.6 196.5
0.0091 1059.9 522.5 354.9 302.5 319.5 0.0083 136.2 195.3 194.5 182.0 169.8
0.2509 978.5 572.2 360.5 334.6 281.5 0.0280 102.5 171.6 173.6 165.9 151.7
A.2. DEP0
0.0002 542.4 714.1 780.0 729.1 767.5 0.0003 737.9 765.5 762.7 744.1 721.6
0.0091 471.7 630.8 710.9 749.4 733.7 0.0083 681.1 674.7 666.7 649.4 627.0
0.2509 343.1 459.0 505.5 516.2 499.8 0.0280 614.9 603.6 592.3 571.6 547.9
A.3. DEPALL
0.0002 4911.1 5756.3 6152.4 5896.8 6136.3 0.0003 6017.3 6058.4 5971.1 5768.3 5535.1
0.0091 4150.3 4878.4 5255.8 5248.2 5370.1 0.0083 5198.9 5170.3 5057.4 4853.0 4602.2
0.2509 2865.1 3514.6 3824.5 3792.5 3805.4 0.0280 4597.9 4567.6 4424.4 4187.8 3923.5
A.4. HID0
0.0002 3.1 11.4 17.0 22.7 14.0 0.0003 20.2 25.8 27.1 30.9 34.8
0.0091 4.4 7.7 15.0 19.8 18.8 0.0083 27.3 27.9 27.9 30.6 34.6
0.2509 8.9 11.5 13.8 16.9 11.4 0.0280 29.4 27.0 30.2 32.4 35.2
A.5. HIDALL
0.0002 35.1 43.3 56.7 61.1 45.0 0.0003 72.2 76.6 78.4 83.1 87.9
0.0091 37.9 65.9 72.6 77.1 68.3 0.0083 68.5 71.1 72.3 75.3 79.8
0.2509 43.1 41.7 48.4 54.8 50.8 0.0280 67.8 67.1 71.4 73.5 75.9
A.6. SPREAD
0.0002 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.081 0.082 0.0003 0.082 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.082
0.0091 0.083 0.085 0.082 0.084 0.082 0.0083 0.081 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
0.2509 0.086 0.084 0.083 0.081 0.082 0.0280 0.082 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
A.6. VOLATILITY
0.0002 0.198 0.077 0.046 0.047 0.042 0.0003 0.043 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.030
0.0091 0.225 0.073 0.046 0.046 0.042 0.0083 0.022 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.029
0.2509 0.441 0.085 0.056 0.056 0.051 0.0280 0.038 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.028
36Panel B: 5-year note
Post-Announcement Period Non-announcement Days
PPIF ( 5;0] (0;30] (30;60] (60;90] (90;120] PPIF ( 5;0] (0;30] (30;60] (60;90] (90;120]
B.1. TRDQN
0.0019 814.6 471.8 342.4 346.1 328.7 0.0011 309.3 258.1 244.9 228.3 210.1
0.0259 659.1 425.3 333.2 282.0 281.1 0.0150 179.4 205.9 205.2 194.6 181.2
0.4542 731.5 454.7 308.9 309.4 271.3 0.0705 141.2 168.1 167.3 159.7 147.6
B.2. DEP0
0.0019 102.6 130.6 152.7 144.5 152.9 0.0011 149.3 150.2 150.2 148.0 144.5
0.0259 93.3 109.0 113.1 112.4 114.4 0.0150 136.8 136.8 136.1 134.2 130.1
0.4542 73.1 88.4 105.8 98.6 103.5 0.0705 93.9 95.9 97.7 96.0 93.8
B.3. DEPALL
0.0019 1433.1 1675.3 1839.3 1794.4 1903.0 0.0011 1885.3 1889.2 1859.0 1795.9 1724.1
0.0259 1017.8 1184.4 1266.3 1264.1 1286.7 0.0150 1646.3 1643.4 1609.3 1544.5 1470.0
0.4542 734.9 902.9 1026.5 1016.1 1041.4 0.0705 988.6 1001.8 994.7 954.3 899.6
B.4. HID0
0.0019 0.0 2.1 3.0 3.0 3.3 0.0011 5.1 5.3 6.0 7.1 7.6
0.0259 0.0 2.1 2.8 4.5 3.0 0.0150 6.0 5.9 6.2 7.2 8.1
0.4542 1.0 1.2 3.5 3.3 4.3 0.0705 4.8 5.3 5.6 6.1 7.1
B.5. HIDALL
0.0019 12.8 22.3 24.0 21.0 20.5 0.0011 33.7 35.1 37.1 39.4 40.0
0.0259 13.3 20.1 24.2 27.3 28.1 0.0150 33.2 34.2 35.3 37.1 39.0
0.4542 18.9 20.7 16.7 22.1 30.0 0.0705 29.9 31.5 33.9 34.4 36.4
B.6. SPREAD
0.0019 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.093 0.091 0.0011 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090
0.0259 0.095 0.097 0.092 0.094 0.091 0.0150 0.090 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091
0.4542 0.110 0.105 0.101 0.102 0.099 0.0705 0.096 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095
B.7. VOLATILITY
0.0019 0.574 0.190 0.125 0.138 0.112 0.0011 0.105 0.095 0.091 0.087 0.081
0.0259 0.539 0.206 0.138 0.126 0.132 0.0150 0.072 0.092 0.089 0.084 0.080
0.4542 0.951 0.248 0.164 0.160 0.150 0.0705 0.119 0.104 0.099 0.095 0.090
37Panel C: 10-year note
Post-Announcement Period Non-announcement Days
PPIF ( 5;0] (0;30] (30;60] (60;90] (90;120] PPIF ( 5;0] (0;30] (30;60] (60;90] (90;120]
C.1. TRDQN
0.0007 788.0 441.0 331.7 301.2 308.0 0.0015 278.7 233.2 218.0 204.0 186.3
0.0193 632.4 373.7 280.8 270.5 273.4 0.0175 147.1 172.5 171.9 161.8 153.1
0.4527 704.3 423.4 283.0 287.1 244.4 0.0783 114.5 133.6 136.3 133.8 124.1
C.2. DEP0
0.0007 107.8 127.0 143.7 141.5 144.2 0.0015 148.8 149.7 149.5 147.8 145.2
0.0193 104.5 125.0 130.8 137.5 135.0 0.0175 128.5 130.5 130.3 128.8 126.4
0.4527 77.1 95.9 103.4 99.4 106.9 0.0783 94.6 93.2 94.8 94.7 93.7
C.3. DEPALL
0.0007 1564.8 1855.9 2068.0 2022.1 2124.7 0.0015 2212.6 2222.9 2187.5 2111.4 2020.7
0.0193 1420.3 1657.9 1758.5 1748.4 1795.4 0.0175 1831.4 1823.4 1778.1 1697.5 1604.7
0.4527 966.6 1251.4 1390.6 1408.5 1427.0 0.0783 1138.5 1147.1 1125.1 1072.6 1012.1
C.4. HID0
0.0007 0.6 2.3 2.5 3.7 3.5 0.0015 4.8 4.8 5.0 6.1 6.3
0.0193 0.3 2.1 2.5 2.4 3.1 0.0175 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.7 6.5
0.4527 0.6 1.4 1.7 2.3 2.3 0.0783 3.5 3.7 4.2 4.6 5.1
C.5. HIDALL
0.0007 10.9 18.4 25.3 33.1 33.5 0.0015 39.5 40.6 42.2 43.7 44.6
0.0193 8.0 15.3 21.2 17.7 22.0 0.0175 34.6 35.3 37.2 40.2 42.9
0.4527 12.5 17.7 21.6 23.5 27.1 0.0783 24.4 25.9 28.8 31.0 31.7
C.6. SPREAD
0.0007 0.185 0.180 0.183 0.179 0.173 0.0015 0.174 0.174 0.175 0.174 0.174
0.0193 0.187 0.177 0.178 0.181 0.178 0.0175 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.178 0.178
0.4527 0.191 0.191 0.179 0.179 0.180 0.0783 0.185 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.185
C.7. VOLATILITY
0.0007 0.971 0.336 0.250 0.224 0.215 0.0015 0.181 0.170 0.162 0.155 0.145
0.0193 0.866 0.328 0.229 0.232 0.223 0.0175 0.129 0.161 0.154 0.147 0.140
0.4527 1.836 0.420 0.257 0.259 0.248 0.0783 0.205 0.175 0.169 0.162 0.154
38FIGURE 1
Intraday Market Activities
This ﬁgure plots market activities in each half-hour window during the day from 7:30 to 17:00. Variables include
trading volume ($ millions), trading duration (seconds), relative bid-ask spread (£10;000), return volatility (%)
calculated from 5-minute returns based on the mid bid-ask quote and average depth at the best bid/ask ($ millions)
calculated over each 5-minute interval.
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40FIGURE 2
Intraday Plots of PPIF
This ﬁgure plots the average estimates PPIFOFIM for the 2-year note in each 5-minute interval during the
trading day from 7:30 to 17:00, based on the combined model of return volatility and order ﬂow impact in (??).
The intraday patterns are plotted for (a) all days in the sample, (b) days with announcements and (c) days without
announcements.
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